SSRG International Journal of Economics and Management Studies Volume 6 Issue 10, 41-50, Oct 2019
ISSN: 2393 – 9125 / https://doi.org/10.14445/23939125/IJEMS-V6I10P106

Original Article

Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail: The Ugly Truth behind Failed Industrialization Efforts in Africa

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Abstract - *The contention of this paper revolves around the posit that failing to plan has been a major contributory factor to failed industrialization efforts in Africa. To examine this posits, the paper employed a methodological review of three countries i.e. Uganda, Tanzania, and Ghana on a random selection basis. Indeed the findings from the three cases demonstrate that the absence of good planning for industrialization has contributed to hampering industrialization efforts in these countries. It is ascertained that this situation is not only limited to the three reviewed cases, rather, it is also possible that a similar situation has been behind failed industrialization efforts in other African countries that have not been reviewed. In conclusion, the paper winds up by calling upon countries on the African continent to plan well and plan with a purpose if they are to realize their industrial efforts.*

***Keywords* -** *Plan, Planning, Industrialization*

I. INTRODUCTION

Industrialization is where a country moves from an economy dominated by agricultural output and employment to one dominated by manufacturing [1] as in [2]. It often involves the establishment of factories that transform raw materials into readily finished products. In developed economies of North America and Europe such as Britain, Germany, Belgium, and France, this process took place between the mid-18th to early 19th century while Africa and Asia were not parties to the party at that time. Reference [3] points out that any industrialization process requires a strong development-oriented state with a long-term vision of structural transformation, highly committed political leadership, and effective transformative institutions.

However, important to note is that the desire for Africans and the African continent as a whole to get industrialized is not a new song to the ears of many on the continent. In fact, in recent times, the calls for Africa to industrialize have gotten stronger than ever before. This is a true manifestation of the desire for industrialization on the continent but amidst this desire; one is forced to ask...*What then is hampering Africa's Industrialization efforts?*

Reference [4] narrates that, Africa is a land of opportunity endowed with natural resources necessary for resource-based industrialization. The continent is said to be sitting on more than US$82 trillion in discovered natural resources. In addition, Africa possesses other natural resources such as minerals, rivers, forests, fisheries, etc., in vast quantities worth a significant amount. Not to mention the value-added of its fisheries and aquaculture alone is estimated to be more than US$24 billion.

With such endowments, the words of the late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania during the Uganda-Tanzania war of 1978 can best explain Africa's industrialization position. That is *Uwezo tuna on. Sababu tuna you na Nia tuna you***-** simply translated; we have the ability, we have the reason and we have the justification. Put in the context of this paper, Africa has the ability, reason, and justification to get industrialized. This being the case, the question of what then is hampering Africa's Industrialization efforts becomes a justifiable question that needs to be explored.

In exploring this question, this paper posits that Africa's industrialization problem lies in the notion ''failing to plan is planning to fail''. The paper concludes that this is an ugly truth behind the failure of industrialization efforts in Africa that needs to be dealt with.

II. METHODOLOGY

This paper bases its findings on previous studies and documentations to draw conclusions on the state of industrialization efforts on the African continent. As such, the guiding methodological approach employed in the paper capitalizes on past research regarding efforts towards the realization of industrialization from three randomly selected countries on the African continent (Uganda, Tanzania, and Ghana). These three countries were selected on the basis of their past versatile efforts towards realizing their industrialization ambitions.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Results presented in this paper mainly focus on three major areas that include; the trend of industrialization efforts in selected countries on the African Continent, Major planning bottlenecks towards the realization of industrialization on the African Continent, and the way forward for realizing industrialization on the African Continent.

A. *Trend of Industrialization Efforts from Selected Countries on the African Continent*

There is no doubt that African countries and their governments are striving to achieve their industrialization aspirations. In fact according to [5], in a report on economic transformation in Africa, Governments of most African countries are taking different policy approaches to industrial growth. For instance, Ethiopia is employing the targeted approach with a focus on special economic zones following the initial success of Hawassa Industrial Park. Kenya is exploring opportunities from small firms with emphasis on how they can play a part in the country's economic transformation; while Tanzania has decided to take a more risky approach by forcefully intervening in the market for cashew nuts among other related efforts.

Indeed even among policymakers and scholars alike, there is a general consensus that industrialization is a fundamental path to economic growth and development. This explains why African countries from the past to date continue to implement various strategies that will promote industrialization. A good illustration as noted by [6] is from the recent launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) to serve as a single market for goods and services in Africa while seeking to unlock the potential for industrialization of the continent.

Reference [6] further points out that African leaders are increasingly appreciating and realizing that without industrialization, achieving economic transformation and development on the continent is next to impossible. Unfortunately, despite this growing desire for industrialization, realizing this goal is increasingly becoming a nightmare as efforts implemented by many African countries continue to yield less and therefore failing. As a result of this situation, the surfacing question hinges on what exactly is the problem behind the failure of several industrialization efforts being applied by most countries on the African continent?

To sufficiently respond to this question, this paper begins by taking a trajectory trend analysis from three randomly selected African countries (Uganda, Tanzania, and Ghana) to understand their industrialization policy directions and the planned strategies for implementation of such policies.

a) The Case of Uganda

Since independence, Uganda has been attempting efforts of capitalizing on industrialization to propel the economy to middle-income status and eventually to a first-world economy. According to [7], Uganda was among the few African countries that had a thriving industrial sector prior to independence. There were small and medium, as well as large-scale industries, and their development was boosted with the establishment of the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) in 1952. UDC was charged with the responsibility of promoting the establishment of industries, including joint ventures, negotiating finance, and attracting direct foreign investment, as well as promoting the establishment of industrial research institutions and related support services.

However, according to [1] as cited in [7], most of the established industries produced consumer goods and thus failed to create the necessary meaningful forward and backward linkages with other sectors of the economy and more so the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the industries relied heavily on foreign raw materials and technology and did not alleviate the unemployment problem. Over the years, the industries failed to create the desired impetus for economic take-off for national development.

With the stabilization of the political environment in the 1990s, the government put in place a number of measures to boost the industrialization drive. These included; the Industrialisation Policy and Framework (1994-1999), development of industry and industrial support institutions like Uganda National Bureau of Standards, Uganda Industrial Research Institute, Uganda National Council for Science and Technology, Uganda Investment Authority, among others. These measures and institutional capacity building paid off such that between 1992 and 1998 annual production grew from 11.8% to 17%, industrial GDP contribution grew from 10% to 20% and the number of industrial establishments increased from 1320 to 11,968 as stated in [7].

Reference [7] further points out that to capitalize on the achievements, these measures were followed with other policies in the 2000s; Medium Term Competitiveness Strategy for the Private Sector (MTCS)—2000-2005, 2005-2009, Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)—2004-2008, the National Industrial Policy of 2008-2018, and the National Industrial Sector Strategic Plan 2010/11-2014/15. The interventions that were employed to boost industrial development before 2000 saw industry contribution to GDP growth from 10% between 1980 and 1990 to 20% between 1990 and 2000. Unfortunately, the applied interventions thereafter did not register as much success as an industrial contribution to GDP. GDP in the years 2000-2010 oscillated between 22% - 24% as revealed in [8] and according to [1] as cited in [9], this level of industrial contribution to GDP is below the targeted mark of 35% for countries aiming to achieve middle-income status.

In short, Uganda's industrial growth somehow stagnated during this period with its average contribution to GDP standing at 20.4% as cited in [10]. This trend was largely attributed to a lack of an integrated plan that integrates the efforts of all sectors towards industrialization. Generally, as noted from Figure 1, Uganda's industrial contribution to GDP has not been substantial when compared to the efforts that have been applied. This is a clear indication that something is wrong with the manner in which the country plans its industrialization efforts and that needs to be addressed.

Fig. 1 Trend of Industrial Contribution to GDP in Uganda



Source: As cited in 10: World Development Indicators

However, leaving behind the past and thinking of the future, with the country's development vision of 2040, Uganda aims at making its industrialization desire a reality and thus become a transformed modern society. The revival of this ambition is embedded in the vision 2040 in which a review of development paths of developed countries and emerging economies show that, except for a few oil-exporting countries, there is a strong positive correlation between industrialization and rapid development as in [1]. As such, industrialization is expected to benefit the country through employment creation, increased export earnings, wide tax base, increased purchasing power, product diversification, increased integration with agriculture, greater efficiency, technical modernization, and higher productivity throughout the whole economy as noted by Uganda's Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industrialization 2008.

b) The Case of Tanzania

Like the case of Uganda, Tanzania has equally since independence been attempting efforts of capitalizing on industrialization to propel the economy to middle-income status and eventually to a first-world economy. According to [11], Tanzania's industrial sector has evolved through various stages since independence in 1961, from nascent and undiversified to state-led import substitution industrialization, and subsequently to deindustrialization under structural adjustment programs and policy reforms. Fortunately, the current development agenda has however brought industrial development back to be one of the policy priorities.

In Tanzania, industrialization has been characterized by shifts in roles of the state and private sector: starting with largely private sector driven industrial development up to the mid-1960s as reflected in the First Five-year Development Plan (1964–9), shifting to largely state-driven industrial development from 1967 to the mid-1980s as reflected in the Second and Third Five-year Plans (1969–74 and 1976–81). It then shifted back to private sector driven industrialization after 1986 as reflected in the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) of 1986–9 and the Economic and Social Action Programme of 1989–92 in which liberalization and privatization were practiced followed by initiatives to revert back to industrialization as a development agenda from the mid-1990s as indicated in the Sustainable Industrial Development Programme of 1996–2020 and the Integrated Industrial Development of 2011.

Between 1961 and 1967, industrial development in Tanzania was defined by the introduction of the three-year development plan (TYP) for 1961–4 and the First Five-year Plan (FFYP) for 1964–9. The TYP aimed at promoting growth mainly through increasing investment in those activities that were expected to bring quick and high returns. A relatively low degree of regulatory control was exercised to promote private domestic and international investment in the economy.

Unfortunately, despite these efforts, Tanzania's industrial sector continued to stay low. This situation was attributed to a number of factors such as the pervasive lack of indigenous investors which further exacerbated the lack of growth and expansion of the industrial base. Other marginalizing traits of the local economy at the time such as small market size, low agricultural productivity, high illiteracy, and continued focus on low-skill labor-intensive agricultural production, contrived to undermine the development of an industrial base in the country.

In 1967, Tanzania inaugurated the national policy for nationalization and self-reliance through the Arusha declaration. This declaration in 1967 accelerated the fight for principles of socialism and self-reliance on major means of production. The Arusha declaration advocated for utilization of local resources as primary endowments in production, and in effect signaled the end of low level direct regulatory control and the reliance on foreign private investors. Nationalization of large foreign-owned enterprises ensued as did the expansion of the public sector. Increased state control in manufacturing saw the introduction of an industrial licensing procedure under the National Industries Licensing and Registration Act of 1967.

The Arusha declaration encouraged the state-led expansion of manufacturing and a revision of ownership and management of established entities in favor of direct ownership and management of state organizations. Foreign ownership of production was subsequently limited to joint ventures with the government. Foreign investors participated through management agreements and as suppliers of equipment for industries. Direct regulatory control in manufacturing was then consolidated through the establishment of the National Development Corporation while trade was largely operating under the State Trading Corporation as cited in [11].

Later the government adopted a structural adjustment program (SAP) for the period 1986-95. This led to the transformation of the economy from one being wholly state-owned to one involving private ownership of production processes. The World Bank later carried out a Formal Sector Industrial Survey in 1989 to evaluate the impact of the reforms on the growth of output and structure of the industrial sector since the mid-1980s; findings showed that overall industrial performance had improved. The 7 percent (p.a.) decline in manufacturing GDP between 1979 and 1986 had been reversed so that it grew by 5 percent (p.a.) between 1986 and 1989 according to [12] as shown in Table 1

Table 1. Performance of Textile Establishments

Year	Public owned	Private owned
1980	57.6	16.9
1981	55.6	27.8
1982	47.4	31.3
1983	34.4	18.3
1984	33.0	16.5
1985	27.1	25.0
1986	23.3	28.2
1987	15.9	63.7
1988	13.7	71.1
1989	16.2	72.8
1990	16.3	58.1

Source: As cited in 14

From the above performance in Table 1, it can be noted that before the introduction of the structural adjustment reforms, public textiles were performing better than private-owned textiles. However, with the introduction of reforms in 1986, privately owned textiles began to perform better than public-owned textiles. This may have been as a result of the government's emphasis on the use of the economy's own resources to bring growth into the industrial sector while putting restrictions on elements of private ownership but later it was reversed to favor private textiles.

In 1996, a twenty-five-year Sustainable Industrial Development Policy for Tanzania (SIDP2020) began to be implemented with the aim of enhancing the sustainable development of the industrial sector. During the period 1996–2020 the government aimed at achieving sustainable industrial sector growth in order to create favorable levels of employment, economic transformation, equitable development, ISI, and export promotion. The private sector was recognized as the main vehicle for making direct investment in the industrial sector while the government would provide an enabling environment.

In 1999 Tanzania adopted the development vision 2025 with emphasis on the role of the industrial sector for development and aiming at the nation to be semi-industrialized by 2025. Vision 2025 recognized the leading role of industry in transforming the economy. Unfortunately, currently, industries have been confronted by a series of interrelated external shocks, such as hikes in food prices, increases in energy prices, electricity cut-offs, and financial crises. As revealed by [11], these have implications for real output. Recent studies suggest that economic development requires structural change from low to high productivity activities. This underscores the need for upgrading and diversifying the industrial base as pointed out in [13]

In June 2010 an Integrated Industrial Development Strategy (IIDS) 2025 was also adopted for the purpose of promoting efforts to achieve the SIDP goal of bringing the economy to a state of sustainable industrial development. The IIDS 2025 (June 2010) was formulated with a view to providing concrete strategies to implement SIDP 2020 and build a competitive industry by putting in place a competitive business environment and improving existing development corridors—concentrated infrastructure development and promoting agriculture-led industrialization.

Despite all these invested efforts, the industrial sector in Tanzania still remains relatively small. In fact, according to Real GDP growth at constant factor prices, as forecasted by the World Bank, the industry real GDP growth is anticipated to be as presented in Figure 2.

Fig. 2 Tanzania's Industry Real Growth at Constant Factor Prices



Source: World Bank Poverty & Equity & Macroeconomics. Trade and Investment Global Practices

Overall, according to the data on Tanzania GDP annual growth rate from [15], the Service sector is the biggest sector of Tanzania's economy and accounts for 40 percent of GDP, namely wholesale and retail trade (12 percent); public administration and defense (6 percent) and transport and storage (5 percent). The primary sector accounts for 30 percent of GDP, mainly due to crops production (18 percent) while the industrial sector represents 28 percent of total wealth, namely manufacturing (6 percent) and mining and quarrying (5 percent) including natural gas, gold, diamonds, coal, iron ore, uranium, nickel, chrome, tin, platinum, coltan, and niobium.

It is therefore evident that, even with these statistics, the industrial sector is the weakest sector in terms of its contribution to the country's GDP despite the invested effort in the sector. Such results tend to question the suitability of both past and present efforts towards the promotion of industrialization in the country.

c) The Case of Ghana

Ghana has since independence undergone three major episodes of industrialization namely an inward overprotected ISI (import substitution industrialization) strategy (1965–83), an outward liberalized industrialization strategy (1984–2000), and since 2001 industrial architecture based on value-added processing of Ghana's natural resource endowments through a private sector-led accelerated industrial development strategy [16].

Indeed Ghana's industrial development post-independence has evolved from an ISI strategy to the current private sector-led industrialization program. Prior to Ghana's attainment of political independence in 1957, the industrial sector, a corollary of the colonial economic system, was a small sector (mainly made up of a domestic manufacturing sector) that contributed very little to economic growth. The industrial sector that was inherited from the colonial rulers was one that had been underdeveloped mainly because the regime was more interested in extracting raw materials from the Gold Coast (Ghana) while at the same time creating an economic system heavily dependent on manufactured products from Britain.

At the time when Ghana gained political independence from the British, the political leadership at that time i.e. the Nkrumah-led Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government viewed industrialization as a key factor for modernization and development. According to [17], the CPP government gave priority to import substitution because it was believed that it would help dispense with the distorting effect of the colonial system, escape from dependence on primary exports, and break the vicious circle of poverty.

From the mid-1960s the ISI strategy was characterized by a strong reliance on import substitution through high levels of effective protection, to reduce economic dependence on imported goods, and to resolve balance of payment difficulties arising from increasing import bills and stagnant export earnings. The government resorted to administrative controls in the form of import tariffs and licensing but was found not successful according to the World Bank (1985). These controls formed incentives that created excess capacity and inadequate linkages with other growth-enhancing sectors as revealed by [16].

By the beginning of the 1970s, the ISI strategy began to face structural bottlenecks against the backdrop of a shift from a centrally planned to a market-based economy during the Busia-led government in 1969 as stated in [17]. In addition, as revealed in [18], by its nature the ISI strategy was self-limiting in two ways. By discouraging the growth of exports and agriculture, the ISI strategy ensured that foreign exchange earned by Ghana could not keep pace with the need to import raw materials and spares for the many import-substituting industries that had been set up. Second, the effective protection granted to the industries under the ISI strategy made such import-dependent industries inefficient in utilizing domestic resources.

As a result of external shocks and inappropriate domestic policies during the period from the mid-1970s to 1983, the industrial sector and the Ghanaian economy as a whole suffered a severe worsening in economic and financial performance. The structural bottlenecks resulted in a decline in the growth of the economy throughout the late 1970s, with real GDP declining by an average of 2 percent per annum between 1979 and 1982. Over this period the structure of production shifted away from industry to services and trade, while agriculture maintained its importance by contributing over half of real GDP.

In 1983, the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was initiated specifically to arrest and reverse the decline in all sectors of the Ghanaian economy and also to rehabilitate ruined productive and social infrastructure. The SAP/ERP sought to correct the structural macroeconomic imbalances that the Ghanaian economy faced by restructuring almost all sectors of the economy including the industrial sector. Soon after the initiation of the ERP, the industrial sector in general and the manufacturing sector, in particular, responded positively to the reforms and this laid the foundation for Ghana's industrial recovery after a decade of decline.

However, the positive response from the ERP was short-lived because later in the 1980s, growth in the industrial sector slowed down. This decline in growth rates was attributed to the slow response to the economic reforms by the private sector in the face of institutional and structural constraints such as the adverse effects of trade, exchange rate, and financial sector liberalization, the lack of effective linkages between manufacturing and other major sectors, especially agriculture, and increased investment in the other sectors at the expense of the industrial sector. Structural constraints included unreliable water and power supply, infrastructural bottlenecks, problems of land acquisition, an unstable industrial relations environment, and perverse bureaucracies in government systems.

As a result of the sluggish growth over the period 1989–94, the government in 1994 set up a committee to examine the constraints facing the domestic industries resulting from the ERP. The result was the identification of three ways in which the economic reforms had negatively impacted the industrial sector. First, it overexposed protected domestic industries to competition from imported manufactured inputs. Second, financial liberalization and exchange rate reform (which resulted in the rapid depreciation of the cedi and high costs of credit) led to increased production costs and production cuts within the industrial sector. Third, the reforms did not allow most industries enough time to adjust and build the necessary restructuring that was needed after a comprehensive reform.

Based upon the committee's recommendations the government introduced a number of measures to help the distressed but potentially viable industries to recover from the shock of the economic reforms. This included the setting up of the Business Assistance Fund (BAF), the Private Enterprise and Export Development Fund (PEED), the Trade and Investment Programme (TIP), the Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises Development, the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), and the Ghana Trade and Investment Gateway project (GHG). Although the industrial sector responded positively to the measures, there was only a marginal increase in growth rates. This meant that more was yet to be done.

During the first half of the 2000s, there was a shift in the focus of Ghana's industrialization strategy. The government's broad policy objective was aimed at creating wealth by transforming the nature of the economy to achieve growth, accelerated poverty reduction, and the protection of the vulnerable/excluded within a decentralized, democratic environment. The emphasis during that period was to stabilize the economy and lay the foundation for sustainable, accelerated, and job creation agro-based industrial growth.

The policy strategies for the industrial sector during this period aimed at promoting agro-processing, facilitating the development of commercially viable export and domestic market-oriented enterprises in the rural areas, improving agricultural marketing and enhancing access to export markets, and improving the competitiveness of domestic industrial products, among others. The industrial sector responded positively to these initiatives as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Ghana's Industry Growth after Reforms in the 2000s

Year	Industry Growth (%)
2001	2.9
2002	4.7
2003	5.1
2004	5.1
2005	7.6

Source: National Accounts and State of the Ghana Economy (SGER) (ISSER 1991–2011)

As revealed by [19], despite an improved performance, the industrial sector by 2005 continued to face challenges expected to continue to endanger its growth prospects in the future. High costs of credit (high lending rates), unreliable power supplies, and rising fuel prices continued to compel especially import-dependent manufacturing firms to cut back production. In addition, the liberalization of external trade continued to expose many vulnerable domestic manufacturing firms to severe competition from imported manufactured goods making the sector less attractive to potential investors.

The overall contribution of the industry sector to national GDP has been not stable as indicated in the Table below and hence the sector is seen to be experiencing unstable sluggish growth. This again questions the efforts being employed to uphold the sector in Ghana. Currently, the sector contributes to around 28 percent of GDP while the service sector contributes the highest with 49 percent.

Fig. 3 Ghana's Trend of Industrial Contribution to GDP



Source: State of the Ghana Economy (SGER)

Generally as revealed in Figure 3, Ghana's growth trend of the industrial sector in terms of its contribution to GDP has not been convincing when compared to the efforts that have been invested in the sector over the years. This again shows some form of failure on the planning part to sustain what has been achieved and at the same time prosper the sector.

B. Synthesis of Major Observations from the Reviewed Country Cases

From the onset, the argument put forward in this paper is that failure to plan is a major contributor to failed industrial efforts in most countries on the African continent. The three reviewed cases do testify to this fact based on the following accounts/major observations;

a) Instability in growth trends of the industrial sector

Vividly, from the three explored cases, none of the countries has demonstrated the ability to sustain the growth levels of the industrial sector. All cases show that the industry sector is very much threatened by versatile factors, some of which could have been avoided or dealt with if proper planning had been taken into consideration. For instance, most industries lack a forward and backward linkage which to a large extent threatens their continued existence since they cannot support one another. Good planning requires that industries that demonstrate a strong forward and backward linkage should be given more priority as compared to those that do not have such attributes. Failure to capitalize on this attribute saw these countries establishing some industries that completely do not use the available raw material especially from agriculture which is a dominant source of raw material in many African countries.

b) Too much application of trial and Error policy regimes to develop the sector

Policy regimes for industrial sector growth in the reviewed countries lasted for a very short period of time before they were changed. This is an indication that proper policy planning for industrial development was not carried out as required. As a result, these countries ended up jumping onto the implementation of certain policies without understanding the consequences in terms of the impacts of such policies. Good planning requires that any policy rolled out for development intervention should be well thought out, analyzed and its implementation actualized. Unfortunately, as observed from the three cases, industrialization policies lacked completeness in their analysis and planning which saw these countries implement several uncoordinated policies within a very short time frame.

c) Using reactive approaches as opposed to proactive approaches to develop the industrial sector

It is evident that from the three reviewed cases, a lot of effort was applied towards the realization of industrialization. The unfortunate thing is that there is very little to account for when compared to how much effort had been applied. This paper has observed that, although a lot of effort in form of introducing various policies, plans, and strategies was applied, much of this effort came in the form of reactive solutions. Solutions that come to massage the occurrence of a problem in the industry sector after it has happened and not before it has happened. From a development point of view, this is a very wrong path to consider if you want to sustain development. Good planning is meant to foresee such future unanticipated challenges and come up with possible remedies for implementation before they happen.

d) Underestimating the impact/influence of the external Environment

This is also one of the noted observations from the three reviewed cases. In the process of implementing their industrialization policies, the situation in the reviewed cases is that they seem to have assumed the non-existence of the external influence. In the end, most of the established industries could hardly survive as a result of stiff competition from the outside world. A good foresight at what the external environment has to offer in terms of opportunities and challenges is a necessary factor that would have assisted these countries to understand what lies ahead of them and how can they avoid it. Unfortunately, as noted from the cases, this was never given due consideration and as a result, many of the established countries were scammed to the problems from the external environment.

e) Underestimating the power of the private sector-driven strategy

The private sector-driven strategy requires that the private sector comprising of individuals, institutions, and organizations lead the development process while the government as a public agent provides an enabling environment for the private sector to operate smoothly. Unfortunately from all the reviewed cases, the much-preferred strategy for industrialization was the public-led development strategy with the government leading the process of industrialization. In some cases, even well-functioning private entities were forcefully turned into public entities. It was not until things started going wrong that governments of these countries returned to the private sector strategy as a rescue mechanism. So underestimating the power of the private sector-driven strategy is one of the reasons why the reviewed cases were not able to realize their industrialization efforts.

f) Inconsistent political ideologies as a result of political regime change

Any development requires consistency in ideology, plans, and strategies for its realization. As such, unanticipated changes in ideologies, plans and strategies act as drawbacks to any development efforts. As noted from the three reviewed cases, changes in political regimes came with new development ideologies which defined new development directions. As a result, there was a forward and backward movement in terms of deciding which industrialization direction should be taken by the country and which plans and strategies should be employed to realize the desired industrialization direction. Again this is a clear indication of a shortfall in the planning approaches of these African countries. Planning is about thinking in advance and being able to ensure that what has been planned is actually achieved if possible with minimal alterations.

g) Lack of total inclusiveness

Development is never a one-man show and so is industrialization. Good development is one where everybody is brought on board to make that much-needed contribution. Unfortunately as noticed from the three reviewed cases, undertaking the industrialization process seem to have been a responsibility to a certain group of people while the rest were told to sit back and wait for the fruits. In this case, the politicians and a few business people had the right to participate. This is exemplified by the fact that in all the three reviewed cases, none of the cases had in place strategies, or plans that advocated for the inclusion of all people in industrialization. Instead, the industrialization process was seen as an activity for the privileged few. Good planning requires that development should be participatory in nature and where possible give every member of the society to be part of that development process. As such, failing to see the need for inclusiveness in the industrialization process is another manifestation of failed planning which contributed to failed industrialization efforts in these countries.

Generally, in relation to the trend of industrialization efforts from the selected three countries on the African continent (Uganda, Tanzania, and Ghana), this paper finds that in one way or another, the above seven observations have had a direct impact on the implementation of industrialization efforts in these countries. The paper also notes that this is just a syndrome of what is most likely to have happened in other countries on the African continent.

C. Major Planning Bottlenecks towards the Realization of Industrialization Efforts on the African Continent

The reasons for the continued failed realization of industrialization efforts in several countries on the African continent could be many and vary. However, the focus of this paper is not on discussing the various prevailing bottlenecks, rather only those bottlenecks that relate to planning or have a planning dimension. Based on the reviewed cases; this paper points out the following as the major planning bottlenecks towards the realization of industrialization efforts in several countries on the African continent.

a) Limited emphasis on coordinated planning for industrial development

Drawing from the experience of the three reviewed cases, it is evident that most countries on the African continent pay little emphasis when it comes to ensuring that there is coordinated planning for the kind of industrialization path to adopt. According to [20]; coordination involves a smooth interplay of management functions such that in the end, common objectives are easily achieved. Similarly, coordinated planning seeks to ensure that all planned activities are easily achieved. In the case of industrialization efforts in most countries on the African continent, this aspect seems to have been forgotten. Rather, a lot of emphases is paid to sectoral planning which makes every sector operate in isolation from the other sectors. In the end, the implemented plans and strategies from one sector tend not to smoothly link up with plans from other sectors. This situation has a detrimental effect on the industrialization process because policies, plans, and strategies from one sector tend to be counterproductive to another sector.

b) Lack of Clear priority setting for industrial development

A good plan is based on clearly defined priorities and implementable strategies. From the reviewed cases, one of the noted bottlenecks to industrialization efforts in these countries is to do with poor priority setting. From the planning point of view, priority setting helps to define the development direction to be undertaken. Similarly, in industry development, failure to set proper priorities for which industries to be developed leads to wasting time to develop industries whose realization may never be achieved or develop industries that will not serve when the storm hits. In the reviewed cases, efforts to ensure that industries being promoted were those that could heavily depend on local raw materials were very limited as most established industries struggled with importing raw materials. Ultimately, this explains why it always became costly for some industries to operate, and later they died a natural death.

c) Continued failure to work with integrated Plans

According to [1], integrated plans seek to integrate efforts of all sectors towards industrialization and build on gained advantages to provide a sequenced path for industrialization. Unfortunately, not many countries on the African continent have managed to smoothly incorporate this planning philosophy in their planning for industrial development. The outcome has been that such countries come up with industries that lack forward and backward linkage. It should be noted that integrated planning advocates for joint planning which in the context of this paper requires different sectors of the economy to jointly work together to come up with visible industrialization plans, strategies, and policies.

d) Planning based on out of reach budget (My Neighbour Pays Principle)

There is a continued syndrome of dependence on the outside world in terms of funding development budgets of many countries on the African continent. In the end, this has become one of the major bottlenecks towards realizing industrialization efforts in most countries on the continent. In most cases, the anticipated foreign funding is delayed or comes with stringent strings attached element. In such circumstances, countries faced with this challenge have no option other than to dance to the tune of the funder.

e) Planning to meet politically driven ambitions rather than economically driven ambitions

It is still a common approach in many countries on the African continent that politicians through their political slogans define the industrialization paths of their countries. For instance in Uganda the industrialization process was once led on the slogan of modernization of agriculture, similarly, in Tanzania, it was ''Kilimo Kwanza'' meaning first agriculture and so on. In most cases, activities relating to such slogans are usually given more priority and even government financing is more driven to such areas. Consequently, this turns away the emphasis on other sectors resulting in slowed development efforts including industrialization sectors in such sectors that are not in line with the political slogan. This is a common trend in most African countries and befits good planning principles which dictate that resources should be channeled to more economically promising sectors.

d) Employing massaged planning practices to plan for industrialization

This is another bottleneck toward the realization of industrialization efforts in most countries on the African continent. In practice, planning requires an inclusive process that is participatory in nature. Unfortunately, for some reason, participatory development has not been fully embraced by policymakers and development practitioners. Rather, just a few leaves of participatory planning are taken into account in the form of either consulting or informing. The process of implementing industrialization efforts has found itself disadvantaged by this approach in a way that technical experts only call for consultative workshops in the final stages when all decisions have been made and what remains is to endorse an already developed industrialization strategy, plan, or policies.

e) Planning for industrialization without solid research support

Any attempt to respond to a development effort needs well-grounded research so as to make informed decisions. Similarly, industrialization requires sufficient research to establish niche areas to push forward as priority areas for industrialization. Unfortunately, it is a common practice among countries on the African continent to develop plans, policies, and strategies without backing up from research. For this reason, most countries on the continent lack strategic focus on industries that can do better based on their available resources, investment climate, and market potential. Even in situations where a particular country has an industrial research institute, putting in using the findings from such institute is usually compromised and later trashed. In other cases, the research findings are not even convincing when they are simply cooked.

f) Planning for industrialization with a foreign investor mindset

In many countries on the African continent lies a misconception that it is only foreigners especially from the developed world that have the ability to invest. As a result, most policies, strategies, and plans are usually developed with the intention of attracting foreign investors and not promoting local investment. In such cases, most incentives such as free land, tax holidays, free work permits to employees of foreign investors, and so on are put in place. On the contrary, the local investor is completely ignored and left to suffer the consequences of not meeting the requirements for running an industry.

Generally, to wind up the discussion on major planning bottlenecks to the realization of industrialization efforts on the African continent, this paper acknowledges that there are indeed several planning bottlenecks out there but out of the many, eight of those are as explained above.

IV. CONCLUSION

The defining position of this paper is that failing to plan among many countries on the African continent is a contributor to failed industrialization efforts in these countries. Using a three-country case review involving Uganda, Tanzania, and Ghana, the paper has demonstrated that indeed a shortfall on the planning part from these countries has had a direct impact on the sustenance of industrialization efforts in these countries.

While industrialization remains an important option to economic prosperity for countries on the African continent, the onus of realizing this ambition remains on the African people and their leaders to plan well and plan with a purpose. It should be noted that if industrialization is Africa's path to economic prosperity, then planning well and planning with a purpose is not an option.

V. THE WAY FORWARD

Based on the observations from the three reviewed cases, the English saying ''if you do not know where you are going, any road may lead you there'' best explains the industrial dilemma many countries on the African continent continue to face in their quest to realize their industrialization ambitions. This paper has attempted to demonstrate the dilemma from the planning point of view. It is also in the best interest of this paper to put forward some options from the planning perspective on how the observed dilemma in this paper could be addressed. Five of those options are as pointed out below;

a) Developing clear industrial strategic focus

African countries will need to stop planning haphazardly when it comes to setting priorities for industrialization. They need to be more strategic in deciding which industrial options are worth exploring. Close attention to industry options that offer a forward and backward linkage could be one way of assisting in deciding which industries are more desirable.

b) Localize planned industrial initiatives

It is high time for African countries to embrace their own by supporting locally planned industrial initiatives as opposed to planning with a foreign investor mindset. This also includes encouraging industries that will use more locally produced raw materials than imported raw materials.

c) Plan with a Purpose for industrialization

Undertaking industrialization must be objective-oriented and within means of being attained. African countries need to shy away from thinking of industrialization in the form of business as usual. Purposeful planning requires that everything goes as planned and possible outcomes are clearly defined.

d) Plan inclusively for industrialization

The process of planning for industrialization should be accommodative to all concerned parties. This will enhance participatory development while giving everybody an opportunity to contribute to the industrialization process in the country. Inclusive participation should be seen as a catalyst for the generation of ideas, capacity building, and material contribution to the process of industrialization.

e) Plan for result-oriented industrial research

There is still a need to increase research on industrialization. This includes strengthening the research capacity of the institutions as well as putting in use the research findings for more informed decisions. As such, countries on the African continent need to see planning for industrial research as a necessity if they are to jump frog to the next level in their industrialization process.

Basically, these among other options that have not been discussed in this paper could play a vital role in contributing to the turning around of the industrialization process in many countries on the African continent if well embraced.

Acknowledgment

I wish to acknowledge all those whose write up I have made use of in developing this paper. I am indeed grateful for their effort especially in capturing past industrial efforts in the three reviewed country cases.

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