

An Assessment of Peacebuilding Policy Implementation Strategy in the North East, Nigeria

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Abstract

Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, Nigeria has not only been incessant in attacks but also destabilized no less than 2.1 million people. In this bracket are missing people, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those who remained as refugees in neighbouring countries of Cameroun, Niger and Chad. Though the federal government has taken the lead to restore order, stability and security, this paper sets out to make an assessment of the effectiveness of peacebuilding implementation strategies in the region. The main argument of the paper is that the weak institutional framework has limited the capacity of the Nigerian state to initiate, coordinate and synchronize implementation strategies of de-radicalization, resettlement, reconstruction, reconciliation, and social integration. One primary recommendation is for the government to guarantee security and welfare of the people in liberated communities and enforce peacebuilding process through effective coordination of all stakeholders.

Keywords - Peacebuilding, insurgency, violent extremism, de-radicalization, humanitarian responses, internally displaced persons.

I. INTRODUCTION

For nine years, Nigeria's North East (NE) region has been enmeshed in savage internecine conflicts. The excruciating levels of inequalities, economic deprivations, youth unemployment, high illiteracy and social exclusion gave vent to feelings of marginalization, alienation, discontentment and disillusionment. Thus, the regions of the North-East (NE), as well as the North-West (NW) remained the poorest in the world (Daily Post 2016; Sanusi 2017). Thus in 2009, when a dissident youth group – Boko Haram (BH) (western education is forbidden) commenced its terror campaigns against the Nigerian state, the fragility of the NE region and the smouldered conflict drivers festered unabated. And with the inadequate or no clear-cut peacebuilding measures in place, several humanitarian responses to curb the

menace became entangled in the cycle of the unending insurgency. The fragile peace therefore gave the armed conflict some resemblance of intractability. The security climate across the Lake Chad region persistently remained precarious. The humanitarian crisis evidenced in the death of over 20,000 people, and displacement of about 2.1 million people overwhelmed spirited interventions (UNOCHA 2017). Consequently, thousands of women and girls became increasingly vulnerable to sexual violence and protective 'marriages', while over 50,000 orphaned children in Borno State alone, became ready tools for suicide bombings (Premium Times 2016). Children who escaped or were rescued from BH captivity were rejected for re-integrating into their communities (UNICEF 2017).

In the most crisis-hit States of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, there were reports that 50 percent of the almost seven million people in critical need of humanitarian assistance were children (UNOCHA 2017). Returning refugees and those escaping attacks from hotspots in local communities ran into overcrowded IDPs camps that were in dire straits. Thus, the basic social services in the camps were under huge strain and could hardly go round. Security fears – landmines and proliferation of improvised explosives devices exasperated social tensions and limited IDPs from leaving the camps. Those who tried to return to their communities could not find means of assured survival, welfare and security.

The 2016 Presidential Committee on North East Initiative (PCNI) recorded that an estimated 9 million people have been directly or indirectly separated from occupation, social relations and wellbeing in the North East. For the most cases, efforts seem to be directed to humanitarian interventions, rather than sustained structural peacebuilding plans to employ education even in the IDPs camps, to facilitate reconciliation and de-radicalization preparatory to resettlement and reconstruction in host communities. The other critical dimension is how to coordinate and integrate IDPs in remote communities in the North East and beyond, as well as refugees in neighbouring countries (Chikezie,

2018). Overall, the unending insurgency in the North East has shifted more attention to humanitarian aid rather than addressing the root causes of social disintegration. For the IDPs and less affected communities, people still live in daily threat and fear, which is no real peace.

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Three inter-related theoretical concepts have been employed as a framework for analysis to explain the application and potential for peacebuilding policy in Northern Nigeria. They are: (i) positive /negative peace, (ii) frustration–aggression, (iii) state fragility theory. While frustration–aggression theory is employed to show how unaddressed structural issues would lead a group of people to violent extremism, state fragility tries to explain how weak institutions and governance deficits combine to limit the capacity of the state to maintain law, order and positive peace.

A. Positive Peace & Negative Peace

The concepts of ‘positive peace & negative peace’ are germane in explaining the political and socio-economic issues in Nigeria, which reproduce monumental disenchantment and disillusionment among the citizenry. According to Galtung (1967) ‘positive peace’ is the aggregate of manifest consensual values such as the “presence of cooperation, freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth and development, absence of exploitation, equality, justice, freedom of action...” (Galtung 1967, 14). Positive peace is one that resolves the underlying reasons for conflict, crisis or war. It is not just a ceasefire, but conflict transformation that improves relationship and inspires confidence and peaceful co-existence (Pevehouse & Goldstein 2011). Invariably, where a crisis is occasioned by economic exploitation and political oppression, positive peace means practical policy shift from exclusive socio-economic institutions that serve a few rich to inclusive institutions. The latter enhances well-being, security, equity and social justice for all. In Nigerian context, the persistent structural issues of poverty, hunger, marginalization, neglect, political oppression and repression are indicators of absence of positive peace. This situation in itself is a negation of peacebuilding policy framework.

According to Galtung (1967, 12), negative peace denotes a situation or a condition where there is the absence of war or organized violence, but the people still suffer conditions of threats, fears, oppression, repression and social injustice. For example, in the North-East, the communities liberated from the occupation of the Boko Haram insurgency have been living in daily threats and fear. Practically, they are still experiencing food insecurity and threats in their farm

lands. The story is the same in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. Thus, it is a contradiction to assume that there is peace when majority are poor and ill-treated. Moreso, majority of the people who have returned to their ancestral lands still suffer the pains of their kins and kiths who are still in the IDPs camps across the NE region. According to Ikejiani-Clark & Ani (2009), there cannot be peace, order and stability without equity and social justice. In Nigeria, even when government claims that Boko Haram has been defeated, the poor still get killed, while the elite class merely condemns the killings.

B. Frustration –Aggression Theory.

Propounded by Dollard et al (1939, 1), the central postulation of frustration-aggression paradigm is that “aggression is always a consequence of frustration” and “that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration”. This often leads to scapegoating, when the architect or the source of frustration cannot be readily confronted or tackled head on. Malici (2007) explains frustration this way: “an individual’s perception of a hostile environment, coupled with; his pessimism about the realization of goals and finally; the perception that the fate of these goals is in the hands of others”. Modifications from Miller (1941) indicates that it was too generic to assume that all frustrations trigger aggression, while Berkowitz (1987, 71) explains that aggression can also be sparked off by the likely spoils of victory to the aggressor. The viewpoints here agree with Marxian dialectics that material conditions of a people determine their social consciousness. The NE turbulence is not natural. It erupted out of resistance to neglect, social exclusion and sheer inequalities. The youths then found expressions in radical mobilization to bring ‘a new order’. Its uncontrollable dimension was occasioned by the extra-judicial murder of its rallying personality in 2009.

C. State Fragility Theory

The term ‘fragile states’ gained prominence in international development debates in the 1990s. State fragility framework is therefore an offshoot of Fragile States Index (FSI) produced annually by the *Fund for Peace* as a “critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all the states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing the state towards the brink of failure” (Messner 2017). Bersley & Persson (2011) note that a state with institutions that are superbly cohesive and, which aligns with common interest in the distribution of public goods will be peaceful. The capacity of such state will not be eroded. Conversely, if the state lacks this capacity, what would be replaced is “state ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting

property, providing public goods and raising revenue” and “political violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict” (Bersley & Persson 2011,373). Thus, a state with one or both of these pathologies will experience fragility, and higher the symptoms, the greater the fragility (Afonso-Reque-Ferreira 2015). The low capacity of the Nigerian state to live up to its constitutional responsibilities to the citizenry is at the root of debilitating violence in the country, the NE region inclusive. Peacebuilding should therefore target the root causes of violent extremism in the NE in order to restore confidence in the state capacity.

III. PEACEBUILDING EXPLAINED

Akpuru-Aja (2007,63) views peacebuilding as a strategic course of action targeted at restoring the eroded confidence and trust of survivors of violent conflicts. Whether as refugees or IDPs; it is vital to stabilize their terror-hunted minds, and allay fears of re-occurrence. Peacebuilding goes beyond humanitarian interventions and assistance. The critical elements include linking security measures with the process(es) of reconciliation, resettlement and reconstruction in the NE region. In addition, social integration is a necessity and must be sustained through secular/peace education and vocational skills empowerment. For Galtung (1975), peacebuilding entails a number of measures targeted at addressing the ‘root causes’ and the key drivers of violent conflicts, and building the capacities of the locals for effective peace management and conflict resolution. Lederach (1997,20) opines that peacebuilding transcends “post-agreement reconstruction”. It necessarily entails an ongoing integrative approach aimed at not only doing away with the ‘undesirables’, but also engendering “relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes, and structures”. Thus, peace-building demands sustained efforts “to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems” and “place an achieved peace on a durable foundation”(Boutros-Ghali 1992). Peacebuilding is therefore interwoven with human security and conflict transformation to enhance social relations and peaceful co-existence.

The International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (2007-2008) notes that peacebuilding has tangible and intangible dimensions. Tangible dimensions include: “the number of weapons destroyed, soldiers demobilized, jobs created, or dialogues held. The intangible dimensions include: “reconciliation between former antagonists, trust in public institutions, and new norms of dispute resolution”. Thus, while focus is given more to tangible outputs, it is noted that the intangible and qualitative process of change “are much more difficult to induce and assess” when crisis or war is unending.

In essence, if peacebuilding in the NE does not go beyond humanitarian interventions and the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, it will not promote enduring social stability that would make relapse into violent conflicts a near-impossibility.

IV. NORTH-EAST CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING PROCESS

A number of scholars through theoretical and empirical analysis tried to link BH insurgency to poverty, social exclusion and high-handed approach. As noted by Onuoha (2013,413), BH “had incubated in North East, Nigeria since 1995”, but turned violent in advancing its self-imposed cause when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as its Leader in 2002. His extra-judicial execution later in 2009 by the Nigerian Police metamorphosed into a full-blown war against the Nigerian state. Since 2009, the fragility of the Nigeria State has neither ended insurgency nor succeeded in peacebuilding process for the IDPs. On the way forward, Onuohaharps, among others, on the need to “undertake broad socio-economic and political reforms to urgently address the underlying drivers of extremism and violent behaviours”(2013,428).

Corroborating the non-violent posture of the sect from the outset, Dambazau (2014) submits that despite its reservations for western-styled democracy, BH participated in mobilizing support towards the victory of the then Governor of Borno State at the polls. What, however, led to the crisis of confidence between BH and Borno State Government was the latter’s failure to live up to its terms of bargain with the sect. This snowballed into brutal confrontation exemplified in suicide bombings, decentralized attacks with Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs), serial assassinations of suspicious Muslim clerics, and setting ablaze of strategic government establishments. He notes the dimension of environmental degradation manifesting in forms of drought and desertification as unintended drivers of insurgency in the NE. Thus, with the country losing about 1,400 square meters of land to desertification in the NE, especially Borno and Yobe States – which share borders with Cameroon, Niger and Chad, (that lost 95% of its freshwater lakes between 1963 and 1988); the region became adversely affected in “economic activities, physical infrastructure, food security and the environment in general”(Dambazau 2014). The region’s level of economic deprivations and governance failure became evidently unbearable. The solution, to him, lies on right leadership, that will provide good governance.

Oduote (2016,19) argues that the level of disillusionment and discontent in the NE is higher than any other part of the country, hence “Boko Haram feeds on this discontent”. Also, (Esteban & Deraj 1998;

Hirschleifer 1995) argue that perennial inequalities, social exclusion, scarcity of resources, religious strife, and poverty predispose any society to destabilization. Besides, Mustapha (2012) opines that BH as a symptom of the failings of democratic enterprise in Nigeria led disgruntled youths crushed by socio-economic system on one hand, and repression by the state on the other hand, into violent extremism. Mustapha (2014) insists that the alienation from the secular state explains the emergence of 'God's warriors' dedicated to cleansing the society of ills of corruption and injustice through jihad, embracing death in the process. Isa (2010,329) argues that chronic "poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness" are at the root of insurgency in the NE. Ali Ndume, a serving senator from the NE posits that aside BH insurgency, the region is ravaged by poverty, hunger and malnutrition (*Daily Post* 2016). Ottoh (2015) notes that BH insurgency is driven by combined motivating factors of political, cultural, economic, religious and radical extremism; underbelled by ideological rigidity and uncompromising stance. For him, the establishment of Almajiri schools by government is a step in the right direction in curbing "further radicalization of Islamic ideology and create a rich culture-sensitive approach to religious moderation" (2015, 39).

Lisher (2003) observes that the IDPs camps in Borno State had a faulty beginning in peacebuilding. There was no structural rehabilitation plan from the government. Left more to their fate, the camps were not fertile for peacebuilding, but all manners of crimes. And that contrary to media reports, there was no guarantee that both the federal and Borno State governments had effective implementation of peacebuilding plans in Borno State. The security environment remained uncertain.

According to Hamzat (2017) education is the key to peacebuilding. He argues against the notion that education should be part of post-conflict peacebuilding process, rather he insists that the IDPs have a right to education at all times. Thus, the submission that governments and stakeholders should pay more attention to education plans in IDPs, including efforts to help the IDPs access education in the language they understand better. For him, education remains critical to the resettlement, reconciliation and social integration of displaced persons.

The work of Itumo & Nwobashi (2016) reveals that IDPs from Borno and Adamawa States are also located outside the NE states. They are mostly in Uhogua in Ovia North Local Government of Edo State. Thus, the pre-occupation with administration of humanitarian aid supersedes plans for them to return to their respective liberated communities. They doubted whether peacebuilding can be effectively achieved from exile

abode. Social welfare administration notwithstanding, the widows, orphans, and youths still cry for a security climate to help them return to their respective homes and commence the cultural and political process of social integration. Furthermore, Holzer (2012) argues that peacebuilding process is negatively affected by enduring harsh and deplorable socio-economic conditions in IDPs camps and returnees to home communities. He notes that such atmosphere of negative peace makes de-radicalization rather difficult. Long period of confinement and overcrowding in the IDPs camps create feelings of despair, which is likely to lead to chaos.

There is no doubt that the several literature are related to the subject matter. Some of them have focused on the narratives of insurgency, while others focus on the humanitarian crisis and the piece-meal works on peacebuilding in the NE. In effect, less than adequate attention has been given to an updated assessment on peacebuilding policy implementation in the North East. Thus, this paper attempts to fill this gap in knowledge.

V. AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEBUILDING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NORTH EAST

Given the strong link between security, peacebuilding and development, the Nigerian state has found it necessary to develop and employ policy development instruments to unsettle difficulties on the path of peacebuilding in the North East. Foremost of such effort includes:

- i). The North East Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA)
- ii). 2016 Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI)
- iii). The 2017 North East Development Commission (NEDC)
- iv). 2017 Bama Initiative for the Resettlement of the IDPs in Borno State
- v). 2018 Approval of \$1 billion from the Excess Crude Account

The first move to reconcile BH insurgents with the Nigerian state was made by former President, Olusegun Obasanjo in 2011 in Borno State. He met with Babakura Fugu, in-law of slain BH leader Mohammed Yusuf. Mr Fugu was gruesomely murdered 24 hours after the meeting. Other political negotiations could not yield anything as BH was not disposed to dialogue. However, the *Victim Support Fund* (VSF) launched peace, reconciliation and social cohesion programmes in communities seriously destroyed and traumatized by insurgency, with pilot schemes in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council and Askira/Uba Local Government Area of Borno State. The European Union (EU), the British Council and Borno State Government

also collaborated to establish Sexual Assault Referral Centre for treatment of rape and gender-based violence victims. These were geared towards given psycho-social support to the violated women. As commendable as these interventions were, the challenge remains with the lack of broad-based plan to holistically address the problems in all affected areas.

In August 2015, the Nigerian government sought collaborative support and technical assistance of European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and World Bank (WB) in carrying out a comprehensive assessment of the needs related to peacebuilding and crisis recovery in the NE. This led to the broader plan for the region, encapsulated in the North-East Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA). RPBA is a blend of strategic vision and action-plan for 'coordinated and coherent' support to NE States of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi. The assessment was conducted across the three inter-linked components of "peacebuilding, stability and social cohesion; infrastructure and social services; and economic recovery" (Mariam et al 2016, 1). We shall analyse three of the afore-mentioned interventions in the NE.

A. 2016 Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative

In October 2016, President Buhari inaugurated a Presidential Committee on North East Initiative (PCNI), with a mandate to coordinate all interventions including public, private, national and international humanitarian actors. According to Nigeria's Minister of State for Budget and National Planning, the national government and the six North East States spent \$6.4 billion on interventions in 2 years (Ahmed 2018). In the last quarter of 2017, the bill for the creation of North East Development Commission (NEDC) was assented by Nigeria's president, with the responsibility of "among other things, receiving and managing funds allocated by the Federal Government and international donors for resettlement, rehabilitation, integration and reconstruction..." (NEDC Act 2017). However, there was no clear short, medium and long term implementation strategies with timelines to achieve peacebuilding.

B. Bama Initiative for the Resettlement of the IDPs

The Nigerian government in July 2017 announced that it would start the resettlement programme of displaced persons in the city of Bama, situated 72 kilometers from Maiduguri, Borno State capital. Once a city of 300,000 people, over 75% of its infrastructure got destroyed in September 2014 by BH; and about 30,000 survivors flee to IDPs camp in the city, while 250,000 were scattered in a dozen IDPs camps within the locality, but under the scrutiny of the

military (Foucher et al 2016). The Bama reconstruction programme was premised on a contributory arrangement of 67 percent and 37 percent by the Federal Government and Borno State Government respectively. For its take-off, arrangements were made for the construction of 3,000 housing units, 10 police stations, 18 primary and secondary schools, health-centres with 20 doctors and 100 nurses/health workers, and the reconstruction of Maiduguri-Bama-Daral-Jamal-Banki Road, with other roads adjoining communities in Bama (Akande 2017). Inclusive in the broad plan for community security is the proposed creation of Special Bama Squad (Agro Rangers) to be manned by 1,500 local hunters that would be recruited (Akande 2017). In February 2018, PCNI flagged-off the Housing Refurbishing Material Support Programme geared towards supplying building materials for the on-going reconstruction works for returnees in 9 Local Governments Areas (LGAs) in Borno State; and donated health-care facilities for the furnishing of Bama Hospital (Daily Post 2018). These efforts are on-going.

C. 2018 Approval of \$1 billion from the Excess Crude Account

In the first quarter of 2018, the Federal Government approved, albeit controversy, a sum of \$1 billion from the country's Excess Crude Account to address insurgency in the NE. Since the said approval, the strategic plan on its distribution on specific targets are yet to be in public domain for implementation. Again, the Governors from the oil-rich Niger Delta region have evoked Section 162(1) of the country's constitution to demand for 13 percent derivation entitlement on the approved \$1 billion. This remains an unresolved issue, which is likely to distort or delay fund allocation and implementation to mitigate extreme human insecurity conditions across Nigeria, particularly in the North East. In all, the Nigerian state is expected to specify what the humongous \$1 billion will be in the context of updated data on the North East Recovery and Peacebuilding

VI. POLICY DEVELOPMENT: PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS BY THE NORTH EAST STATES

Before the interventions in Bama, the Borno State Government had built and presented over four hundred 2-bedroom flats as permanent residences of insurgency victims in three communities (Umarari, Gwaidamgari and Jajeri), whose houses that became the stronghold of BH were razed down during military offensives, in a bid to decapitate the insurgents (This Day 2016). However, the major challenge has remained the safe return of IDPs. A significant majority of IDPs wished to return to their ancestral homes but physical damages, economic situation and security concerns, exemplified

in the fear of landmines/explosives are a major obstacle (Mariam et al 2016). There is no evidence on ground to show government's landmines clearance programme in order to allay these legitimate fears. Besides, the first phase of the reconstructions by the Federal Government does not have timelines, and the displaced persons are not sure of when they will return home.

In Borno State, the state has set up a specific agency known as Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement. The primary function is to coordinate and manage the return of internally displaced persons to their communities for empowerment and self sustenance. An approximated number of 428,077 are reportedly living in liberated Local Government Areas, while about 41,335 have returned to their six (6) respective LGAs; yet, the near absence of reconstruction, reconciliation and empowerment process has created uneasiness, weak social cohesion and psychology of living in bondage of threat and fear (Chikezie, 2018). For them, normal or positive peace is a far cry because both governmental and traditional institutions seem rather weak.

In Adamawa State, the government has benefitted from the 2016 Recovery and Peacebuilding Assesment (RPBA) estimated at \$660 million for peacebuilding and social cohesion, economic recovery, infrastructure and social services. And the goal has been to, first, stabilize IDPs returning in the affected communities. Most of the estimated 152,618 IDPs in Adamawa State are from Borno State. Incidentally, sporadic attacks, including suicide bombings seem to have unsettled effective coordination of efforts to implement lasting peacebuilding process.

Yobe State is not left out in peacebuilding efforts. In 2015, the State Governor stated that his administration spent \$83million on social welfare to address insecurity and deplorable conditions of the IDPs (Mariam, 2016). About 70% of the IDPs are from Borno State. However, 7 out of 17 LGAs are affected by Boko Haram insurgency. They include: Gulani, Gugba, Yunisari, Geidam, Damaturu, Fika and Potiskum. However, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) from Yobe State reported that its displaced population in Bauchi and Gombe States (3,037 and 6,789 IDPs respectively) have started returning. And to facilitate resettlement and social integration, the Yobe State government has set up a Committee for Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Social Integration of IDPs. The committee is also supported by the Yobe State Emergency Management Agency (YOSEMA). For the most part, the arrangement has been largely adhoc and less than adequate in coordinating other key stakeholders like traditional institutions, faith-based organizations and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). For the IDPs, they need far more than humanitarian relief materials. They are still uncertain

about their future in terms of security, social integration and occupational farming engagement(s). There is also a concern on the interface between the federal government and state governments.

From the foregoing, the Nigerian State does not lack peacebuilding and policy development framework. The strength or weakness of its implementation should be measured by the degree of humanitarian crisis across IDPs camps and security friendly climate in the entire NE region. It is imperative for the restoration of public confidence and trust in the capacity of the Nigeria State to facilitate the process of de-radicalization, reconciliation, resettlement and reconstruction.

VII. UNENDING INSURGENCY AND LIMITATIONS OF PEACEBUILDING

Attempts would be made to examine some of the challenges faced in peacebuilding efforts, which are largely driven by the unending insurgency.

A. Increased Out-of-School Syndrome

Human Rights Watch (2016) notes that "Boko Haram's attacks and governments' neglect and misuse of schools have contributed to the dismal state of education in the northeast". On one hand, over 2,295 teachers were killed, 19,000 displaced, and almost 1,400 schools broken down since 2009 across the NE states; and by early 2016, about 952,029 children of school age had fled the violence (Porter 2017; HRW 2016). Consequently, only 57 percent of schools in Borno State could re-open in the 2016/17 academic year. On another hand, government failed to effectively protect the schools and other soft targets; rather the security forces took over the schools for temporary bases and IDPs camps. This was against the 2015 Safe Schools Declaration, which entails non-usage of schools or universities for launching-out of any military offensives. The implication is that a set of generation in school age are being denied access to formal education. And this must account for the growing but frightening statistics of over 13 million out-of-school children in Nigeria, with Almajiri taken a chunk of 10 million, according to the 2016 Report of National Council for the Welfare of Destitutes (NCWD) (Muhammad 2018).

B. Persistence Atmosphere of Threat and Fear

The resurgence of BH asymmetric warfare after the claims of 'technical defeat' by the military and government spokespersons, has created deepening levels of distrust, fear, trepidation and unsettling discomfort. In 2017, the cases of 83 suicide bombings in the first quarter by misguided children; the ambushment of oil workers, university geologists and soldiers on oil prospecting mission; and shooting and eventual hacking to death of 31 fishermen in two

Islands of Lake Chad Basin depicted that the area was still under siege. (AllAfrica.com 2017). Thus, as logic expects, no meaningful planning and development can take place in an environment of uncertainty, fear and insecurity. The scenario escalated human security quagmire. In fact, the invasion of military barracks at Sabon Garin Kimba, Damboa Local Government Area of Borno State on 16 April 2017, where the soldiers were overpowered, and their weapons, fuel and foods carted away by the insurgents, sent dangerous signals and pushed the locals to take abode in bushes (AllAfrica.com 2017). The continued terror campaigns are a huge disincentive to peacebuilding. The BH attack and report of abduction of about 100 girls from a school in Dapchi Yobe State on 16 February 2018 continued to send signals of palpable insecurity. Although all the children except one have been negotiated out from the abductors, the other source of persistent fear for the returnees to ancestral lands or expected returnees from the IDPs is the risk of unexploded mines. Though this risk or fear is limited, it has a space in risk education component of peacebuilding process.

C. Food Insecurity and Famine in the North East

Mounting food crisis is another fallout of BH cyclical insurgency, which slowed down farming activities, and resulted in food shortages. It was reported that “in rural areas, people are not able to venture more than four kilometers out of the main towns in each local government area because of insecurity” (AllAfrica.com 2017). BH also resorted to seizing foods and goods to finance terror campaigns. Many farmers could not access their farmlands in distant and remote places. Thousands of farmers relocated, abandoned their farms and did not harvest the crops; while many others left fertile lands untilled, as a result of escalation of attacks. Before now, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States were not only famous for supply of varieties of nutritious fish, fruits and vegetables, but also served as a hub of commercial activities because of proximity to Lake Chad and borders to neighbouring African states. Definitely, when a significant number of working populace took flight or sought refuge in IDPs camps, and waited daily for handouts from government and charitable agencies to survive, likely results would be three-fold. First, food supply would be inadequate. Second, those doing business on the value chain will lose out; and third, scarce resources would be under unforeseen strain.

The most difficult to integrate into both humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding process are those in inaccessible areas of IDPs and missing peoples. Persistent delay or failure by the governments to address agricultural livelihood support system continued to have a broad negative impact on

peacebuilding and development in the North East (Magnus, 2017).

D. Profiteering from Peacebuilding Process

Peacebuilding process is logically difficult where political and business merchants make wealth out of every attempt by government to control the level of insecurity or sustain initiatives on confidence building measures for the IDPs and devastated communities. The diversion of relief materials meant for the IDPs constituted a major setback to the management of humanitarian crisis and peacebuilding development. Officials of Borno State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) were implicated in the diversion of 50 bags of rice meant for the IDPs, while a supervisory councillor in Mafa Local Government and four others in the state diverted 300 bags of rice donated by Danish Refugees Council (DRC) (Daily Post 2017). Despite the Federal Government’s deployment of about 1,376 military personnel and 656 police officers to guard the distribution chain in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States, officials are still implicated in the criminal diversions of relief materials.

E. Increased Security Funding at the Expense of Human Security Programmes

The continued terror campaigns by BH had resulted to increased budgetary allocations to the defence and security sector to rout the insurgents. According to BudgIT (2017,35), the security budget trends over the years are as follows:

- a) 2012 - N885.6bn
- b) 2014 - N937.8bn
- c) 2015 - N964.7bn
- d) 2016 - N1.05trn
- e) 2017 - N1.17trn.

The inference from the foregoing is that funds that are supposed to be deployed to tackle the root causes of the insurgency were/are spent on security tending. The opaque nature of public procurement also raises the issues of transparency and accountability. Even when the Nigerian state has expressed concerns for the refugees, IDPs and de-radicalized insurgents/terrorists, there is no clarity yet of peacebuilding policy framework, including coordination and synchronization of governmental and non-governmental efforts towards implementation strategy.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This paper is set out to evaluate the effectiveness of the Nigerian state on the implementation of peacebuilding policy framework in the North East. Consistent with the argument that the fragility of the Nigerian state has invariably weakened the institutional framework for peacebuilding process, the prevailing

condition between and among the IDPs and refugees is more of negative peace rather than positive. As well intended as humanitarian aids are to the IDPs and fear stricken communities, they do not substitute the desired condition of welfare, security and social integration in the host communities. In a situation where more than 2 million people are still in the bracket of missing persons, IDPs and refugees, the implementation of peacebuilding process cannot be said to have been effective. This is also true where the ‘degraded’ capacity of the Boko Haram insurgency has left in its trail occasional attacks, suicide bombings and persistent threat and fear. Moreso, the excruciating deplorable conditions of the IDPs and the host communities show that governments have less than adequate commitment to provide such confidence building measures towards de-radicalization, resettlement, reconstruction and social integration.

Without necessarily ending the insurgency, in the short run, the Nigerian state should take lead on the use of the following. First, there is need for the centralization and coordination of humanitarian services to IDPs in camps and those in remote communities. Second, the all-inclusive stakeholding on peacebuilding process should prioritize the use of instructional educational learning media to de-radicalize and build social relations capacity in the language better understood by the affected communities. Third, for the IDPs who have returned to their fractured homes, community policing should be approved and codified to strengthen security agencies and traditional institutions in promoting peaceful co-existence. Finally, and in the long run, government must know that in peacebuilding process, there is no alternative to addressing conditions of neglect and injustice which breed despair, poverty, and human insecurity.

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