*Original Article*

# The Implications of Group Participation on Israeli-Arabs Community Politics

Yaron Katz

*Holon Institute of Technology, Israel.*

*Abstract -* *This paper examines the social structure of the Arab community in Israel and the impact of their social identity on voter turnout. It is argued that their participation in the political process is based on collective identity concerns while voting by incorporating group behavior translated into political choices. The study uses the case of Israeli Arabs to analyze the implications of group participation and a sense of community in their voting behavior and parliamentary politics. Through studying the situation in the Arab society in Israel, this essay argues that collective self-determination can be realized with voting in the political system. Participation in the elections serves special functions of the Arab population and its leaders, which should be understood in light of the complex citizenship relations with the state and the Jewish majority. Group vote demonstrates the continuing relevance of identity and community politics among Israeli Arab voters, reflecting their growing alienation from a political system that structurally excludes them from political influence. But despite being a large and potentially influential minority representing 20% of the general population, their limited electoral strength is due almost entirely to low voter turnout. This can be explained in traditional Arab politics, which adopted a tendency of strategies of radicalization and confrontation with the state. In contrast, recent changes in Arab politics seek to expand the meaning of citizenship beyond liberal limits and adapt it to new conditions to meet the minority's expectations of equal citizenship. The main issue investigated here is if these changes would increase voter turnout and expand their political impact or lead to further integration in the general society and lesser impact on community Arab politics.*

*Keywords -* *Identity, Community, Arab-Israeli, Israel, Election.*

## 1. Introduction

Israel is an ethnic democracy dominated by the majority of the Jewish people with equal rights to its Arab citizens (Smooha, 2021). The Arabs are a minority in Israel and have conflicting social identities. The Israeli government refers to them as "Israeli Arabs." Still, many community members identify themselves as "Palestinian citizens of Israel" or just as Palestinians, indicating their rejection of Israeli identity. Others prefer to be referred to as Arab citizens of Israel because they seek equal rights as Israeli citizens. These two main social identities are often conflicted, as community members feel they belong to the Arab world but want to be part of Israeli society (Nasser and Hrabar, 2017). These conflicting social identities have impacted Israeli politics as they dominate the traditional voting of the Arab minority. While most Arab community members have supported their political leaders' refusal to join any government, other community members argue for strategic voting to allow their political leaders to gain an active role in Israeli society and the political system (Lustick, 1990).

The attitudes of Israeli Arabs enhanced their political opportunities. The multi-party parliamentary democracy allows for a proportional representation and inclusion of minority parties. However, Israel's Arab minority did not have much political influence and maintained a permanent opposition position. This political stance prevented Arab politicians from joining the government and having political achievements that would benefit their communities. The lack of political influence resulted in low turnout and inconclusive participation of Arabs in the elections. The research argues that Israeli Arabs were left out of key political positions of influence because of their own political choices. The main issue examined here is if changes in the political behavior of the Arabs towards more participation in Israel's politics can lead to changes in community identity and what impact these changes would have on the political landscape of Israel. In other words, the research debates if integration in general politics would lead to a higher turnout of Arabs. This question leads to another question about their position as a minority group - would higher turnout maintain their community voting and cause upheaval in the traditional two-bloc system of Israeli politics, demonstrating the unique position of the Arabs as a minority group that takes advantage of the party parliamentary system?

These social developments have serious implications for Israel's political and social structure since Israel faces a demographic challenge which arises from the inversely related population trajectories of Jewish and Arab Israelis.

Zuckerman (1990) maintains that the decision to vote for a particular party results from a voter's position in the social structure, as Israeli voters display patterns of electoral stability and change much like those in other democracies. Still, since by the year 2025, the Arab population of Israel will be about a quarter of the total population, internal changes in its social and political structure require to assess of the impact of the realignment of the parties that represent community interests on Israel's political system and on future issues which will be on Israel's political agenda.

## 2. Materials and Methods

The materials in this research include an analysis of statistical information, related research, and an analysis of the author as to the conclusion of social behavior at the heart of this paper.

### 2.1. Social Identity and Community Politics

Social identity refers to a person's sense of self-derived from perceived membership in social groups (Sen, 2007). Group identity explains such phenomena as discrimination and political campaigns (Coleman, 1961). Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed the social identity theory to understand the psychological basis for intergroup discrimination. They proposed that individuals define their identities about social groups and that such identifications work to protect and bolster self-identity. Tajfel (1978) proposed that groups give a sense of social identity and belonging to a group. Once group members adopt their identity and categorize themselves as belonging to the group, they compare that group with other groups. Thus, social identity is people's sense of whom they are based on their group membership. A social group is a set of individuals who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the same social category (Turner et al. 1987).

Social identity determines community politics since individuals who identify with a particular social group tend to be associated with their community and utilize their support to achieve political outcomes (Lim & Putnam, 2010). Group identity affects individual political behavior as community members tend to adopt agendas that they believe can benefit the interests of their group identity (Shih et al. 1999). In the case of Israeli Arabs, Jamal (2007) claims that minorities seek to reframe and expand the meaning of their citizenship by utilizing the structures of opportunities available to them through citizenship and by mobilizing whatever resources possible to improve their status. As demonstrated here, the political arena provides the Arab minority with an influential vehicle to achieve the community's goals. Accordingly, being in the status of second-class citizens in an ethnic democracy (Peled, 2005), Arab society has adopted a strategy of community belonging. It employs its minority behavior through voting in elections within a traditional Arab society (Zeedan, 2018).

However, despite the social structure and identity of the state to allow Arab cultural autonomy, the majority of Israel's Arab citizens are still committed to community interests (Frisch, 2005). Bligh (2013) claims that full Arab Israeli involvement in the national political system is disappearing from the political scene, and a parallel system is being developed by the community's political leaders where elections to the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) are viewed as intended to bring the Arab Israeli message to Jewish awareness. He argues that judging from the evidence of election results among Arab voters, it is possible to conclude that the Israeli Arab political stance is less and less a part of the general Israeli political culture. According to Rosenthal, Zubida & Nachmias (2018), Arabs decreased their turnout in national elections and increased it in local elections. Jamal (2007) argues that the collective dynamics show that they utilize the opportunities embedded in their citizenship before moving to alternative strategies that may jeopardize the valued incentives achieved so far as citizens.

These social developments conclude that the Arab minority has chosen to abandon accommodative politics and is adopting a more active and challenging strategy. Ghanem (2009) explains that about one-third of Israel's local and regional councils are Arab. However, they suffer from financial crises and administrative and organizational deficiencies that jeopardize their functioning. Local politics avoids social identity conflict and develops political integration through active participation and cooperation between Jewish and Arab parties, separated from national issues (Averbukh, 2021). The local political arena allows the Arab community to balance the ability to work with the State institutions and act freely and independently (Rinawie-Zoabi (2006). Rosenthal (2018) shows that Arab representation and cooperation in cities that receive substantial government support improve Arab Israelis' well-being and concludes that the use of power by minority groups helps them move into a position from which they can effectively change public policies.

### 2.2. Integration without Assimilation

Israeli society presents an interesting case of multicultural existence (Bick, 2001). The relations between Arabs and Jews are the most complex and sensitive among the different population groups because of the ongoing Jewish–Palestinian historical conflict (Lavie, 2018). According to a survey by the Jewish People Policy Institute), there is a significant change in the way Israeli Arabs identify themselves. A quarter defines themselves primarily as "Israeli," and half self-identify as "Israeli-Arab." The proportion of non-Jewish people who define themselves primarily as "Palestinian" stands at only 7%. According to the 2021 survey, many Jews and Arabs agree that "All Israeli citizens, Jews, and Arabs, have a shared future." (Rosner, Slepkov, and Fuchs, 2021).

There are significant differences between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority regarding educational achievements, employment, living conditions, and economical status (Weiss, 2019). The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2021) monitors the gaps between Arabs and Jews. They found that the situation of Jews was better than the situation of Arabs in almost all areas, particularly in employment, economic situation, personal safety, health, housing and infrastructures, education, personal and social welfare, environment, civic involvement, material standard of living, leisure, trust of government and use of information and communication technology. Indeed, Israel is second only to the United States among developed nations when it comes to inequality. The richest 10% earn 15 times more than the poorest 10%, a lot more than the average gap between haves and have-nots among OECD nations, 9.6 times (Staff, 2015). Inequality and poverty in Israel remain high, despite some improvements resulting from the rising employment rate and recent measures to address the problem (OECD, 2018).

Although in the last decade, there has been improvement among Arab Israelis on many indicators (Weiss, 2019), a survey by the Israel Democracy Institute (2019) found that 81% of Jews and 96% of Arab Israelis said they would accept the other as a work colleague; 64% of Jews and 85% of Arabs said they would accept the other as a friend. In 2020, the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) reported "a dramatic rise in the share of Arab Israelis who define their primary identity as 'Israeli,' and a concomitant sharp decline in the share who self-identify as 'Palestinian.' However, in 2021, after the 10-day war in Gaza (Operation Guardian of the Walls), tensions between Israeli Jews and Arabs grew significantly with an outbreak of Arab violence in some mixed cities. A survey by the aChord Center, a nonprofit organization specializing in the social psychology of intergroup relations, found that 60% of Jews felt a high degree of anger and/or fear toward Arabs following these tensions. More than half said they feared boarding a bus with Arabs, and large minorities were also fearful when hearing Arabic spoken in public or encountering an Arab salesperson while shopping. Only 45% of Israeli Arabs felt anger toward Jews, 39% said they felt fear, and 37% felt fear about working with Jews (Bard, 2021).

The lack of interaction exacerbates tensions between Jews and Arabs, with profound distrust among the Arab-Israeli public, which feels oppressed due to discrimination (Milstein, 2021). Buttu (2021) defines the relationship between Jews and Arabs as a "myth of coexistence." Four-in-five Israeli Arabs (79%) say there is a lot of discrimination against Muslims, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey (Lipka, 2016). According to sociologist Sammy Smooha (2021a), Israel's policy toward the Arab minority is based on two principles integration without assimilation and not granting national collective rights to Arabs. The integration principle consists of the extension of civil rights

and the acquisition of the basic patterns of Israeli culture by incorporating them into public institutions. He explains that the Arabs have become accustomed to life in Israeli society and attached to the state. Still, their separate schools and their lives in separate communities are maintained to prevent assimilation. At the same time, Israel denies the Arabs any national collective right, and Jews and Arabs have chosen to live separately.

### 2.3. Declining Voter Turnout

The Arab sector has the electoral potential to win 24 seats of the 120 members of the Knesset. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (2021), the Arab population of Israel was about 1.956 million at the end of 2020, representing 21.1 percent of the total population. But the Arab society is not exploiting its political impact, and the elections to the 24th Knesset (March 2021) brought this to light when the percentage of votes in the Arab sector dropped to an all-time low. Arab society's voter turnout in the latest Knesset elections declined to 45%, compared to 65% in the previous elections (March 2020). It is the lowest percentage in the history of Arab electoral participation since the Knesset elections began in 1949.

The participation of Arab voters in Knesset elections has declined consistently. In the 14th Knesset (1996), overall participation in the general population was 77%, while the Arab vote was 79%. The Arab parties belong to the left-wing bloc. However, the close race brought the victory of the right-wing candidate (Benjamin Netanyahu) and the loss of the candidate of the left, Prime Minister (Shimon Peres), by a margin of about one-half percent. In the 15th Knesset (1999), overall participation was 78.7%, and in the Arab sector, 75%, and the candidate of the left (Ehud Barak) easily won against the right-wing candidate Benjamin Netanyahu. In a special election for Prime Minister in 2001, the Arab voters boycotted the election. The right-wing candidate (Ariel Sharon) had a landslide victory over Ehud Barak, with 67.5% of the votes. In the 16th Knesset (2003), overall participation was 67.8% versus 62% in the Arab community, and again the right-wing camp had an impressive victory. In the 17th Knesset (2006), overall participation stood at 63.5%, while Arab voting declined to 56.3%, allowing a center-right victory. In the 18th Knesset (2009), overall participation was 64.7%, while only 53.6% voted in the Arab community, allowing a marginal but comprehensive win to the right-wing bloc. In the 19th Knesset (2013), overall participation was 67.8% versus 57.3% in the Arab community, with the result that a center-right government was established with a majority of only 62 out of 120 Knesset members. The impact of the declining Arab vote was even more significant in the results of the flowing elections. In the 20th Knesset (2015), overall voting was 72.3% versus 64% in the Arab sector, with the result that the right-wing coalition had a slim majority of one member (61 of 120 Knesset members). In the

21st Knesset (April 2019), the general vote was 68.5% against 49% in the Arab sector. The election ended in a political tie, as the right-wing bloc received only 60 Knesset members. In the 22nd Knesset (September 2019), general voting was almost equal to the previous election (69.8); however, Arab voting increased dramatically to 60%. As a result, the right-wing bloc declined to 55 Knesset members, although the Arab parties refused to join a left-wing government. In the 23rd Knesset (March 2020), the participation among the general public was 71.5%, and in the Arab sector, 65% - still short of breaking the deadlock between the right-wing and the left-wing blocs. In the last election to the 24th Knesset (March 2021), the overall participation was 67.4% and only 45% in the Arab sector.

The participation rate of Israeli Arab citizens fell to an all-time low due to disappointment with the Arab political leadership, who failed to maintain a united front and ran on two separate electoral lists (Ra'am and the Joint List). According to Rudnitzky (2021), competition between the two Arab parties was fierce, and many Arab citizens expressed their anger and dismay by deciding not to vote. However, despite the low participation rate, an Arab party of four Knesset members managed to break the political deadlock and join a center-left government.

### 2.4. The Importance of the Arab Vote

And methods se The dissatisfaction of the Arab community from their political representatives was aimed particularly at the Joint List - an alliance of Arab Israeli and leftist political parties that included Hadash, a non-Zionist, Arab-Jewish party founded through a merger of socialist and communist parties; Ta'al, a secular Arab nationalist party; Balad, a Pan-Arab nationalist, anti-Zionist party; and the Islamist anti-Zionist party of Ra'am. These separate Arab parties formed the Joint List in 2015 after the electoral threshold to enter the Knesset was raised to 3.25%. In the March 2020 election, the Joint List managed to gain 15 seats, the most for any Arab party in history, making it the third-largest party in the Knesset. But their political achievement was not implemented because the Joint List's constituent factions refused to join any government, and Jewish-Zionist parties stated their unwillingness to work with the Joint List. The isolation of the Joint List from national politics represents the broad spectrum of ideologies of Arab citizens of Israel was demonstrated by their traditional policy that advocates an end to the occupation via a two-state solution. The Joint List also faced criticism for voting against ratifying the normalization agreement with the United Arab Emirates, despite widespread support for the deal among Arab citizens of Israel. Wermenbol (2019) explains that despite constituting about 20% of the Israeli population, the Arab minority did not have significant political power as Arab parties played the role of the permanent opposition.

The growing dissatisfaction with the Joint List from within the Arab community led to a political split, with two separate parties having their specific policy platforms. The national election of 2021 was notable for a radical change in Israeli politics, with the Ra'am Party becoming the first Arab party to join a governing coalition.

The United Arab List (Ra'am) is an Arab-Israeli party associated with the southern faction of the Islamic movement. It distinguishes itself from other Arab political parties by its social conservatism. This development in the Arab sector shows the split in the community on the question of integration into the general society. Most Arab citizens aspire to integrate into the fabric of Israeli society and participate in national decision-making on issues of importance to them. But while the Joint List supports these aspirations, it continues to emphasize nationalist issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ra'am supports a more pragmatic approach to joining the government to maximize the party's impact. As a result, if the political deadlock continues in the next elections, the appeal of the Arab vote could increase and enable the Arab sector to score significant achievements, despite the prevailing exclusionary Jewish attitude toward the Arab minority.

The importance of the Arab vote was demonstrated in the success of the political upheaval. This party represents a sub-group in the Arab sector - the Bedouin population in Israel, consisting of 154,569 eligible voters, of which 64,165 or 41.5% exercised their right to vote. Ra'am led the other parties with 46,365 votes, or 73% of the total, equal to one Knesset member. Nevertheless, this small margin was enough for Ra`am to join a government supported by a small majority of only one member (61 of 120 Knesset members). The other Arab party, the Joint List, received 15.9% of the votes. In total. About 90% of the Bedouin voters supported Arab parties, whereas Jewish parties received only a small portion of the votes. These numbers carry a significant conclusion about the impact of community voting. Being the first time in the government and in a critical and influential position as the party which provided the majority vote, increasing the number of voters in this subgroup could enhance the political role of Ra`am as a critical political power player, which could determine who will be in power after the next election.

## 3. Discussion and Conclusion

The research analyzes the unique political stance of Israel's Arab community. As a minority group, they have full citizenship, including the right to vote, but face widespread discrimination in a handful of areas. Nevertheless, Israeli politics is a bi-bloc system; the bloc size decides election results, and party power is based on membership in the bloc. Arab parties support the left-wing bloc, although they traditionally functioned as opposition parties and refused to

join the government. Their opposition stance had been a result of their social identity conflict. While identifying with the Palestinian people and disputing Israel's identification as a Jewish state, they see their future tied to Israel. They have adopted Hebrew as a second language and Israeli culture as an extra layer in their lives. At the same time, they strive to attain a higher degree of participation in national life, greater economic integration, and more benefits for their towns and villages. Although Israeli Arabs have occasionally been involved in terrorist activities, they have generally behaved as loyal citizens. During Israel's wars, none engaged in acts of sabotage or disloyalty. In some instances, Arabs volunteered to take over civilian functions for reservists. Political development allows them to balance the ability to work with the State institutions and the ability to act freely and independently (Rinawie-Zoabi, 2006).

In addition to the refusal to participate in the government, the voter turnout of the Arab community in national elections has lagged substantially behind the Jewish turnout. The Arab participation rates are significant because of the close race between the two blocks. Since 2015, all governments have had a majority of one Knesset Member, and in two election campaigns, none of the political blocks succeeded in forming a government. The deciding position of Arab Knesset Members in Israel's multi-party and fragmented political system allows them to gain influential political power and influence decision-making in favor of their community. However, contrary to this political position, the voting rate of Israeli Arabs dropped by about 25% since the first election to the Knesset, while the Jewish turnout declined only by 10%. In addition, in the last elections, about 70% of the Arab vote went to the Arab parties and about 30% to the Jewish parties – further reducing the potential political influence of the Arab parties to determine who would be in power.

The events of the last election raise the question if the Arab public is more pragmatic today, supporting the participation of Arab parties in government coalitions to improve its status in the Jewish state. None of the two political blocks reached 61 members to form a government in the last election. At the same time, the Ra'am party managed to gain four seats – allowing the party to play a decisive role within the Israeli coalition by either joining it or backing it from a distance. No Arab-led party had ever participated in Israel's government coalitions before, and the crucial role of Ra'am in providing the votes was needed to form a close coalition with 61 members and lay a deciding role in forming a coalition government.

The question asked in this paper is if the crucial position of Ra'am allows the party to play a greater role within the government – such a role that would increase voter turnout of the Arab community in the next election cycles. Such development, coupled with the consecutive tie between the left-wing and the right-wing blocks, could change the political landscape of Israel up to the point that the discriminated Arab minority would become the king-maker of Israeli politics. It could also determine substantial social change since Arab citizens of Israel represent one-fifth of the population and could be poised to gain a larger voice in the country's domestic affairs. This conclusion requires further investigations into the impact of these social and political developments on Israeli society and its minority groups.

## Conflict of Interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

## References

[1] Averbukh, Lidia, website, 2002. [Online]. Available: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/73923/ssoar-2021-averbukh-Towards_JewishArab_normalization_in_Israel.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2021-Averbukh-Towards_Jewish-Arab_normalization_in_Israel.pdf

[2] Mitchel Bard, The Status of Arabs in Israel website, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-status-of-arabs-in-israel

[3] Bick Etta, 1st Ed, "*The Shas Phenomenon and Religious Parties in the 1999 Elections*," Israel at the Polls, 1999.

[4] Bligh Alexander, "Political trends in the Israeli Arab population and its vote in parliamentary elections," *Israel Affairs*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 21-50, 2013. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2013.748286

[5] The Myth of Coexistence in Israel website, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/25/opinion/israel-palestinian-citizens-racism-discrimination.html

[6] J. Coleman, "The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and Its Impact on Education," New York: Free Press, 1961.

[7] Fritsche et al., "Collective Reactions to Threat: Implications for Intergroup Conflict and for Solving Societal Crises," *Social Issues and Policy Review*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 101-136, 2011. *Crossref*, https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2011.01027.x

[8] Ghanem As'ad, "*The Bi-National State Solution*," Israel Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 120-133, 2009.

[9] Jamal Amal, "Strategies of Minority Struggle for Equality in the Ethnic States: Arab Politics in Israel," *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2007. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1080/17450100701381821

[10] Ephraim Lavie, "*Integrating the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israeli Society: Time for a Strategic Change*," Institute for National Security Studies, 2018.

[11] Lim Chaeyoon, and Putnam D. Robert, "Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 75, no. 6, 2010. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410386686

[12] Israeli Jews and Arabs have different perspectives on discrimination in their society website, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/25/most-israeli-jews-do-not-see-a-lot-of-discrimination-in-their-society/

[13] S. Lustick, 1st Ed, "*The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs*," The Elections in Israel-1988, 1990.

[14] Milstein Michael website, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/crisis-relations-between-jews-and-arabs-israel-can-rift-be-healed

[15] The Arab and Israeli Social Identities of Arab Adolescent Muslim and Christians in Israel website, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://ejournal.vfu.bg/bg/pdfs/Habib%20article%20gender.pdf

[16] OECD Economic Surveys website, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Israel-2018-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf

[17] Peled Yoav, "Restoring Ethnic Democracy: The or Commission and Palestinian Citizenship in Israel," *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 89-105, 2010. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1080/1362102042000338898

[18] Rinawie-Zoabi, "*The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*," National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006.

[19] The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel website, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/newsletter/eng/dec06/tasawor-mostaqbali.pdf

[20] Rosenthal Maoz, "When does descriptive representation become substantive? Systematic luck, social power, and the allocation of resources," *Ethnicities*, vol. 19, no. 6, 2018. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796819833062

[21] Rosenthal Maoz et al., "Voting locally abstaining nationally: descriptive representation, substantive representation, and minority voters' turnout," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 41, no. 9, 2018. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1295161

[22] The 2021 Israel Pluralism Index: Consensus and Disagreements website, 2021. [Online]. Available: http://jppi.org.il/en/article/index2021/#.YfPbSP5BzIU

[23] A. Sen, "*Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*," Penguin Books India, 2007.

[24] Shih M, Pittinsky TL, and N. Ambady, "Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance," *Psychological Science*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 80-83, 1999. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00111

[25] Smooha Sammy, "*Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2019*," Academia, 2020.

[26] Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel After the May 2021 Unrest: A Survey by Sammy Smooha website, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://fathomjournal.org/arab-jewish-relations-in-israel-after-the-may-2021-unrest-a-survey-by-sammy-smooha/

[27] The Times of Israel website, 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.timesofisrael.com/oecd-report-inequality-worst-in-israel-and-us/

[28] H. Tajfel, "*Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*," London: Academic Press, 1978.

[29] Tajfel H, and J. Turner, "*An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*," Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, pp. 94-109, 1979.

[30] The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics website, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2021/Gaps-between-Jews-and-Arabs-in-Well-being-Indicators-in-Israel-2019.aspx

[31] Conditional Partnership 2019: Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel website, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/28654

[32] Turner et al., "*Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*," New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987.

[33] A. Weiss, "*A Picture of the Nation: Israel's Society and Economy in Figures*," Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel Jerusalem, 2020.

[34] The Ongoing Divide: Palestinian Participation in Israeli Elections website, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.mei.edu/publications/ongoing-divide-palestinian-participation-israeli-elections

[35] Zeedan Rami., "Predicting the Vote in Kinship-Based Municipal Elections: The Case of Arab Cities in Israel," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 87-102, 2018. *Crossref*, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2018.1432149