What is the Product, unless and destructive, on the Business Entrepreneurship

International Journal of Economics and Management Studies
© 2017 by SSRG - IJEMS Journal
Volume 4 Issue 6
Year of Publication : 2017
Authors : Hossein Niavand, Farzaneh Haghighat Nia
How to Cite?

Hossein Niavand, Farzaneh Haghighat Nia, "What is the Product, unless and destructive, on the Business Entrepreneurship," SSRG International Journal of Economics and Management Studies, vol. 4,  no. 6, pp. 1-5, 2017. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.14445/23939125/IJEMS-V4I6P102


We distinguish an uncertainty encompassing organizations and enterprise. While enterprise makes social incentive at the economy level in the fitting institutional condition, person business visionaries may make or decimate an incentive in any institutional condition. This raises the address: under what conditions does enterprise make social esteem? Social esteem creation relies on upon the business person's next best option, and foundations are imperatives on the important choices. Subsequently, society is in an ideal situation when business people explore poor establishments with respect to decreased entrepreneurial action. Besides, business visionaries participating in apparently "profitable" action require not make social esteem. We delineate the contention with two illustrations.


Business, Entrepreneurship, Institutions, Regulation, Public funding.


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