Technology Transfer in the Intermediate Goods: One Case in Vietnam
International Journal of Economics and Management Studies |
© 2020 by SSRG - IJEMS Journal |
Volume 7 Issue 12 |
Year of Publication : 2020 |
Authors : Thi Hoang Oanh Nguyen, Thi Thuy Linh Duong |
How to Cite?
Thi Hoang Oanh Nguyen, Thi Thuy Linh Duong, "Technology Transfer in the Intermediate Goods: One Case in Vietnam," SSRG International Journal of Economics and Management Studies, vol. 7, no. 12, pp. 62-66, 2020. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.14445/23939125/IJEMS-V7I12P109
Abstract:
Vietnam has to integrate into the international economy and take part in the global supply chain. Therefore the importation of intermediate goods from foreign providers is inevitable. However, the input supplies initiative helps Vietnamese firms reduce the dependency on the foreign supplies and make productive plans actively. This paper finds the conditions that a foreign firm-a a technology owner- becomes a licensor, and a state-owned enterprise (SOE) becomes a licensee in a good intermediate market. In contrast, the foreign firm competes with the SOE in the input market and a domestic downstream firm in the Cournot fashion's final market.
Keywords:
Technology transfer; licensee; licensor; profit; social welfare.
References:
[1] B. J. Spencer, and. J, Ronald, -Vertical Foreclosure and International trade policy, The Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1) (1991) 153- 170.
[2] D. Chen, L. F. S. Wang, andJ. Y Li, -Foreign Ownership, Privatization and Sub-sidization with Shadow Cost of Public Funds, North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2018, Forthcoming.
[3] E. Gamberoni, R. Lanz, and R. Piermartini, -Timeliness and Contract Enforceability in Intermediate Goods Trade, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2010-14, WTO.
[4] K. T. Soo, -The gains from trade in intermediate goods: A RicardoSraffa-Samuelson model, International Review of Economics and Finance, 54, (2018), 244-261.
[5] L. F. S. Wang andC. Zeng, -Licensing, entry, and privatization, International Review of Economics & Finance, 62, 2019 230-239.
[6] L. F. S. Wang, A. Mukherjee and C. Zeng, -Does technology licensing matter for privatization?, Journal of Pulic Economic Theory, 22(5) (2020) 1462-1480.
[7] M. Arijit, andP. Enrico, -Tariffs, licensing and market structure, European Economic Review, 50, (2006) 1699–1707.
[8] M. C. Chang, J. L. Hu, and C. H. Lin, -The Optimal Licensing Strategy of an Outside Patentee in Vertically-Related Markets, International Journal of Economics and Finance 5(3), (2013), ISSN 1916-971X E-ISSN 1916-972.
[9] S. Lemarié, -Vertical integration and the licensing of innovation with fixed fees or royalties, The 32nd EARIE conference, Porto, 2005.
[10] S. Niu, -Privatization in the presence of patent licensing, Journal of Economics, 116, (2015) 151-163.
[11] T. H. V. Ha, -Intermediate goods trade between Vietnam and China", Intermediate Goods Trade in East Asia: Economic Deepening Through FTAs/EPAs, Bangkok, Thailand, (2011).
[12] W. W. Chang, Winston W., -Optimal Trade and Privatization Policies in an International Duopoly with Cost Asymmetry, The Journal of International Trade &Economic Development, 14(1), (2005) 19 - 42.
[13] X. H. Wang, -Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model, Economics Letters, 60, (1998) 55–62.
[14] X. H. Wang, -Fee versus royalty licensing in a differentiated Cournot duopoly, Journal of Economics and Business, 54(2), (2002) 253-266.
[15] Y. W. Chen, Y. P. Yang, L. F. S. Wang, and S. J. Wu, -Technology Licensing in Mixed Oligopoly, International Review of Economics and Finance, 31, (2014) 193-204.
[16] Atreyee Sinha Chakraborty, Innovation, Technology Transfer and North - South Trade, SSRG International Journal of Economics and Management Studies 3(6) (2016) 11-15.